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Abstract: Birch develops a useful framework for determining when the Animal Sentience
Precautionary Principle (ASPP) should be invoked. He rightly notes that there is a lack of agreement
among social scientists, ethicists, and legislators even about whether the precautionary principle
is useful, let alone when and how it should be implemented. His proposal is to establish a kind of
cognitive threshold, and only when an animal shows a sufficient level of sentience would the ASPP
be appropriate. From the point of view of the Cellular Basis of Consciousness model (Reber, 2016),
all animals are sentient. If correct, the problems Birch identifies need to be confronted from a
different perspective.
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I commend Professor Birch (2017) for his careful overview of the ethical issues that emerge when
animal rights legislation based on the precautionary principle is contemplated. He recommends a
two-stage process. First, set the BAR — determine whether there is evidence that an animal is
sentient and can experience phenomenal pain. When such evidence is presented, ACT to pass
animal rights legislation regulating the treatment of all species in the order of which that animal
is a member. It's difficult to object to Birch's framework and I don't. But, I have thoughts to share,
things worth ruminating about.
Birch's main goal is to set a threshold for the application of the ASPP, find the point in the
pantheon of life where there is enough evidence of sentience to arouse concern but not enough
for scientific certainty. Difficulties, he notes, would arise if the threshold for sentience is set too
low. There "cannot be a default presumption of sentience in all cases" — a position he regards as
"extreme" while acknowledging, seemingly grudgingly, that it could be true.
As I first argued twenty years ago (Reber, 1997) and again more recently (Reber, 2016,
2017), there are good reasons for concluding that, in fact, all animals, including single-celled
species, are sentient. This thesis, dubbed the Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC), is developed
in detail in the forthcoming book, Caterpillars, Karyotes, and Consciousness: An Essay on the
Origins of Mind. In it, an overview of the behaviors of unicellular species is presented showing
that they experience pain, escape from aversive stimuli, and at least one unicellular eukaryote
(Stentor roeseli) can learn to make anticipatory moves to avoid a noxious substance. Prokaryotes
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determine the nutrient-level gradients of their environment, compare them with internal
metabolic conditions, and make deliberative movements away from nutrient-poor areas and
toward rich ones. They have memories lasting anywhere from a few seconds up to two hours.
They also communicate with each other both as individuals and as members of a collective.
Birch lists three behaviors as symptomatic of sentience: (a) self-delivery of analgesics; (b)
motivational trade-offs, weighing the avoidance of a noxious stimulus against other preferences;
and (c) conditioned place avoidance. Unicellular species show the latter two and might also show
the first. Two out of three suffice; Birch opines that even one should be sufficient.
If the CBC model is correct, and these interpretations of unicellular behaviors are accurate,
and I believe they are, then Birch's BAR gets set in a manner that is going to make it difficult to
develop a useful ACT. If every animal is sentient, experiences subjective pain, and behaves in ways
that reflect such phenomenal states, then, perforce, all species come under the umbrella of the
legislative reach of animal rights laws. Does such a conclusion undermine Birch's effort? No, but
it does mean that pragmatic cost-benefit analyses (that he acknowledges are relevant) become
paramount. If there is no demonstrable threshold for invoking the ASPP, then the determinations
must be carried out using a different framework, one more focused on pragmatic and practical
considerations.
Let's take a look at Birch's consideration of the "replacement" principle in scientific
research where one looks for a species from a less-sentient order to replace the one in the
standard protocol. This strategy, from the CBC perspective, touches on a key issue. There are
circumstances where it is considered appropriate to subject some animals to aversive,
experimental treatment, for example, if it is highly likely that the procedure would result in
significant advances in human health. The replacement procedure says look for the least sentient
animal that will provide useful data. But what if the study improved the lives, not of H. sapiens,
but of non-human primates? Or of dogs, cats or cephalopods or crustaceans? In these cases,
would the order or species used in the study be a relevant consideration? Would it be just to
subject a particular species to pain if the outcome is likely to have value to another, more sentient
species?
Animal rights regulations based on this principle would call for us to, somehow, grade the
valence or degree of sentience of the target species. How would we do this? By how many
neurons the species has? Or if not neurons, then what? By Giulio Tononi's information metric Ф
which is based on the number of interacting elements in a system (see Tononi et al., 2016)? Birch
appreciates what a hornet's nest this is:
"... it seems reasonable that a greater degree of sentience should imply a greater
degree of regulatory oversight, although (as noted above) this raises the question
of how degrees of sentience are to be conceptualized and estimated (if such
comparisons are even possible). I cannot do justice to this complex and difficult
issue here."
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Because sentience, according to CBC, is as universal in the animal kingdom,1 it raises yet another
question. Do animals that are dangerous or have no discernible value to human existence, or the
planet's ecology, have rights? In the CBC model, mosquitoes are sentient and feel pain. They are
used in a number of areas in biomedical research. Do we care about protecting them? Should we?
Mosquitoes are the only species to have caused more human deaths than humans. How about
species that threaten the existence of other species? Mites have been implicated in the worldwide epidemic of bee-colony collapse. Can we use mites in painful procedures if it helps save
bees? What if mites turn out to be more sentient than bees.
Then there are those sentient bacteria. Some probiotic species, like Lactobacillus
acidophilus, promote health; others like Mycobacterium tuberculosis are deadly; and still others
like Escherichia coli have strains, some beneficial, others decidedly not. Should only some come
under animal protection legislation when presumably all share equivalent mental states?
We routinely tolerate the imposition of pain when a goal deemed worthwhile is involved.
A trivial but effective example is recreational fishing. A worm impaled on a fish hook is clearly not
having the best of days but we thread the steel through its body because it's an effective way to
attract fish. The caught fish, with its mouth torn by the hook is in pain and dies by drowning in the
bottom of our boat. We countenance such acts because the fish became our dinner or was
mounted over a fireplace or won a prize in a contest. Even catch-and-release sport fishers have
caused considerable suffering. In these cases, we typically do not impose animal rights legislation
or, if we do, it is balanced and pragmatic.
Birch ponders the question of whether bony fish fall under the sentience umbrella. There
is a long thread in this journal initiated by biologist Brian Key who argued (see Key, 2016),
unpersuasively in my mind, that fish do not feel pain and, hence according to Ng (2016), do not
have "welfare." Birch notes that were it determined that fish do indeed pass his BAR and should
be covered by animal rights legislation, as many as three trillion fish a year would come within the
scope of such regulations. He then steps quickly away from the issue. Fish feel pain but it's far
from obvious how to do anything to lessen it within the fishing industry — not to mention the
long-term implications for the diets (and lives) of billions of people, other animals, and the many
secondary industries.
Birch's principles are a solid beginning and lend themselves to the pragmatic stance that
will ultimately determine where, when, and how they are applied and when the precautionary
principle is invoked. From the perspective of the CBC, every animal species is sentient so BAR is
always in play and, by extension, so is ACT. Imposing the ASPP and crafting animal rights legislation
thus have to be balanced, pragmatic, and adjusted by the cost/benefit assessment and the longterm value to society of any imposed regulatory systems and whether those values
counterbalance any unpleasantness that might be left after enactment.
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The plant kingdom is excluded. The argument here is long and technical. It is pursued in the forthcoming book.
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